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RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
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STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

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TAGS: [PARAM](#) [PREL](#) [CWC](#)

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE
WEEK ENDING APRIL 27

REF: THE HAGUE 741

This is CWC-39-07.

P-5 Meeting on Universality

¶1. (U) Status of efforts toward Middle East Universality: UK Ambassador Parker opened the meeting with a briefing on the recent meetings in Cairo. DG Pfirter met with Egyptian MFA officials as well as members of the NGO Council on Foreign Relations, but found no sign of movement towards adherence to the Convention. In fact, the DG was surprised at the very negative views expressed by the MFA and the actively hostile response from the NGO.

¶2. (U) The UK next raised the recent exchange in The Hague between the DG P5 other Ambassadors with an Israeli delegation headed by Miriam Ziv (reftel). All of the P5 ambassadors agreed that the meeting was extremely useful, and that the Israelis presented a surprisingly tough position. The advantage of the "bilateral" exchange was that the Israeli delegation presented its reasoning to the OPCW: the view in 1993 was quite different, and Tel Aviv believed that accession was possible. However, the landscape has changed and currently there is no possibility for Israel to adhere to the Convention any time soon. The Israelis asked what assurances and protections could be provided by the OPCW. The U.S. noted that A/S Rood will raise the issue with senior Israeli officials when they visit Washington.

¶3. (U) In Lebanon, the P5 is waiting to see if the report that Beirut is ready to adhere, but is awaiting the appointment of a Foreign Minister, is merely a technical problem or is a political problem. The P5 debated the impact Syria might be having on the process, noting that it could go either way. Syria might use the Lebanese experience as a tool to learn how the OPCW works in preparation for its own eventual adherence. Or Syria might be using its influence to obstruct the move towards adherence. There was discussion of the possibility that the DG might visit Beirut to meet with Lebanese leaders to lobby for its accession and to influence decision makers in the OPCW's favor. With respect to Iraqi adherence, the MFA is lobbying the Iraqi Parliament to

consider adherence to the CWC, but there is much on its agenda and more time is necessary.

¶4. (U) With the exception of Russia, the P5 ambassadors agreed that now is not the time to make a common P5 demarche. Rather, it would be better to continue bilateral efforts and to share information during regular exchanges. The U.S. and the UK responded that it would be better to let the DG visit Damascus first, to lobby for accession. China noted that a P5 demarche should be used only for a final push when conditions are favorable for success. At this time, it is more constructive to have the DG invite a delegation from the Mideast capitals to an exchange with P5 members in The Hague. Including states other than those in the P5 would make it less stressful for the visiting delegation and would encourage frank discussion of the issues preventing adherence.

¶5. (U) The U.S. noted that workshops have limited value for future efforts on universality. The other ambassadors agreed, with China adding that the workshops serve to increase awareness of the OPCW. Once the public is aware of the work of the OPCW, it will increase pressure for states outside to join. All agreed that the DG visits to capitals in conjunction with exchanges in The Hague are far more likely to bring success than yet another universality workshop.

¶6. (U), Finally, Russia requested that the RevCon be added to the next P-5 agenda. UK Ambassador Parker noted that this could create a conflict of interest for him as the chair of the RevCon Working Group (RCWG), but that he had no objection to a discussion on the deputy level. The ambassadors of China and France also agreed. The U.S. said that it would go

back to Washington to check, but that on an informal deputy level it could make a positive contribution. (Note: After the meeting, Parker remarked that with the staff turnover this summer (U.S., UK), this venue would help bring new members up to speed. It also would help the UK keep France in line, and it could be useful to keep China more on "our" side rather than the NAM side of the issues. End Note.)

¶7. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL